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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
defend, it is perfectly clear that the insurance company
agrees to perform their covenant of indemnity against loss
by assuming the liability and that payment by the insured
was not a condition precedent."
The weight of authority construes "to defend" as
meaning merely to contest the suit to final judgment.
While in a technical sense to defend a suit is to contest it,
the words "to defend" also include the broader meaning
suggested by the New Hampshire court.
The Pennsylvania court 3' says "The insurer has
safeguarded its own interest by ascertaining through legal
channels that a fair loss has been sustained; by its own
conduct at the trial, it is estopped from denying its own
liability and cannot prevent the indemnitee from recover-
ing, though the indemnitee's liability has not been dis-
charged by payment." This is not new in the Pennsylvania
law, it having been asserted previously.3 5 Under this
theory, the court in the West case said, in reference to the
"'no action" clause, "It is the joker of the policy and has
been written out by many legislatures."
We may then conclude that the West case does not
change the law in Pennsylvania but merely supplies dictum
that, if followed in the future, will render a "no action"
clause one of indemnity against liability as contrary to
indemnity against damages.
The necessity of legislation upon this point is urgent.
It should be the duty of the Assembly of Pennsylvania to
legislate upon this subject and safeguard this judicious
trend set in motion by the two recent cases, as the courts
in the future might stay this movement toward advance-
ment.
Adolph D. Weiss.
INJURIES ON GOLF COURSES
The rule seems to be without doubt in Pennsylvania
that to maintain an action for damages for an injury
8 4West v. MacMillan, 301 Pa. 344 (1930).
"5Malley v. American Indemnity Ins. Co., 297 Pa. 216 (1929).
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caused by the alleged negligence of another, there must be
a breach of some duty which one party owes to the plain-
tiff, whereby the latter suffers injury; which injury must
be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence,
such a consequence as under the surrounding circum-
stances of the case might and ought to have been foreseen
by the wrongdoer as likely to flow from his act.1 The ex-
istence of a duty in any particular case, is to be determined
by the reasonable anticipation of a normal man. Thus
one is not bound to control his acts with regard to those
who can be only possibly affected by the manner in which
he acts; he owes a duty of care to those only whom the
normal man should foresee that his lack of care might in-
jure.2
Likewise it has been held that one who voluntarily
exposes himself or his property to a known and appreciated
danger due to the negligence of another may not recover
for injuries sustained thereby even though he was in the
exercise of ordinary care. This doctrine of "assumption
of risk" is said to rest upon, or be in its nature, effect and
import, the equivalent at least of the principle expressed
by the maxim "Volenti non fit injuria", and is to be dis-
tinguished from the doctrine of contributory negligence
because the former is applicable, even though the person
injured was in the exercise of ordinary care.3
The very recent case of Benjamin v. Nernberg4 pre-
sented the question of liability for injury to a fellow player
on a golf course. The defendant was relieved on the
theory that there was an assumption of risk by the plain-
tiff. In that case the plaintiff, while standing some forty-
eight feet away from the line of flight and where one
could not reasonably believe that he was in danger of being
struck by a ball driven from the other green, was hit by
'Hoag v. Railroad, 85 Pa. 293, 298 (1877); Wood v. Pa. R. R.,
177 Pa. 306, 35 Atl. 699 (1896); Sturgis v. Kountz, 165 Pa. 364, 30
Atl. 976 (1895); Scott v. R. R., 172 Pa. 646, 33 Atl. 712 (1896).
zBohlen, Studies in Law of Torts, p. 6. (1926).
sTomey v. West Penn Rys. Co., 300 Pa. 189 (1930); 45 C. J.
683.
'157 At. (Pa. Super. Ct.) 10; 79 Pitts. Legal Journal 47 (1931).
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a golf ball driven by the defendant when the ball was
sliced. It was not until the ball was going directly toward
the plaintiff that anyone thought it necessary to shout a
warning. The court in refusing recovery said, "If plain-
tiff was struck by a ball driven by defendant, the plaintiff
had assumed, as a matter of law, the risk of injury result-
ing from his own participation in the game he and all
others were then playing."
There appears to be no reason why this case could not
have been decided without referring to this theory of as-
sumption of risk. Especially is this true since the court
recognized that a golfer when making a shot must give
a timely and adequate warning to any persons in the gen-
eral direction of his drive. Since the plaintiff was not in
the line of flight of the ball which the defendant was about
to drive, no duty rested on the latter to inform him that a
ball was about to be driven. Therefore, since there was no
breach of duty on the part of the defendant and the injury
not being one which was reasonably forseeable from his
act, he should have been relieved from liability on that
ground.
5
This case does not appear to be in conflict with the
case of Toohey v. Webstere which held that the plaintiff
caddy, although voluntarily present upon the golf links
during the playing of the game, did not assume the risk of
being struck by a golf ball. The court based its decision
on the fact that the defendant failed to give an audible and
timely warning in the proper manner before he made his
shot, to one to whom harm was reasonably foreseeable
from such intended shot.
Thus we see as to fellow players and caddies where
there is harm reasonably foreseeable from the shot in ques-
tion, there is a duty to give an adequate warning of the in-
tended shot. For injury resulting proximately from the
failure to perform this duty, liability attaches.
"The same principle could be applied to the case of Andrey v.
Sterendon, 31 Scotch Law Review 194, 198 (1906), which is analogous
to the instant case.
6117 AtL (N.J.) 838 (1922).
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The cases discussing the liability to a mere spectator
while on the course, entirely disregarded the theory of
assumption of risk by such person injured. In the English
case of Cleghan v. Oldham,7 the defendant "followed
through" in such a manner that the plaintiff was struck and
injured. The defendant testified that she did not look
around before making the stroke. The court observed that
in all such cases a person must refrain from doing what a
reasonable person would not do and if a jury had concluded
that a person had done something which a reasonable play-
er in the circumstances would not have done and if injury
resulted therefrom, the person is liable in an action for
negligence.
Likewise in Schlenger v. Weinberg,8 the plaintiff went
voluntarily to see the links and as his injury was an un-
foreseen and unusual incident that occurred while he was
in the act of realizing his intention, the court considered
the injury was not the natural and proximate effect of the
failure to give warning either by the "member" or the pres-
ident of the "club". But where such member knows that
the plaintiff might reasonably be expected to be struck,
he is under duty to give a warning of the danger to be
incurred."
As to the liability for injuries to a passerby on a near-
by street, caused by a ball which has been played from the
course, there seems to be no dispute. Both the golf club
and the player have been held liable for injuries ;o the club
on the theory of the proximity of the course to the high-
way and the consistent frequency with which balls fell
into the highway, which rendered this particular part of
the course a nuisance; and the player apparently on the
theory that he was negligent in driving while there was
someone on the highway who might be injured by a mis-
directed drive. The liability of both being based on the
reasonable foreseeability of harm to persons on the high-
743 Times Law Report 465 (1927).
8150 Atd. (N.J.) 434 (1930).
9Biskup v. Hoffman, 287 S.W. (Mo.) 865.
10Castle v. St. Augustine Links, 33 Times Law Report 615 (1922).
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way, it follows that the mere ownership of the golf course
would not impute such liability for injury to one struck
by a golf ball driven by a player on the course."
Although the game of golf has been played for many
years by hundreds of thousands of our residents, serious
accidents have been so few that there is very little precise
authority to help the courts.12 However, if our own con-
ception of the few decided cases is correct, there appears
to be no reason for confusing the issues by relieving the
defendant from liability on the theory that there was an
assumption of risk by the injured party. Liability in all
such cases should be sustained only on the ground that
there was a breach of some duty which one party owes
to another, whereby the latter suffers injury, which was
such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances
of the case, might and ought to have been foreseen by the
wrongdoer as likely to follow from his act. Only where
such a breach of duty is found does assumption of risk be-
come involved.
Alexander Denbo.
NOLO CONTENDERE IN PENNSYLVANIA
There has been somewhat of a conflict of authority
as to the propriety of the plea of nolo contendere in Penn-
sylvania where defendant is indicted for any crime which
is greater in degree than a misdemeanor.
It is the purpose of the writer to explain herein the
purpose of entering such plea and when it may be entered
in Pennsylvania so far as the cases have decided. Nolo
contendere is synonymous with non vult contendere (third
person) and non volo contendere (first person).
"The so-called plea of 'nolo contendere' is not a plea
in the strict sense of that term in the criminal law, but a
formal declaration by accused that he will not contehd
with the prosecuting authority under the charge. It is
11Schlenger v. Weinberg, 150 Ad. (N.J.) 434 (1930).
12Toohey v. Webster, 117 At!. (N.J.) 838 (1922).
